X-Git-Url: https://bilbo.iut-bm.univ-fcomte.fr/and/gitweb/canny.git/blobdiff_plain/fdf9d8855582d89072dcd1339af9f5b74a167ac6..24da70a2907152b45f175222de4962951669ac12:/ourapproach.tex?ds=inline diff --git a/ourapproach.tex b/ourapproach.tex index 4539cf1..f832695 100644 --- a/ourapproach.tex +++ b/ourapproach.tex @@ -85,6 +85,27 @@ modifies canny parameters to get a sufficiently large set of edge bits: this one is practically enlarged untill its size is at least twice as many larger than the size of embedded message. +Edge Based Image Steganography schemes +already studied~\cite{Luo:2010:EAI:1824719.1824720,DBLP:journals/eswa/ChenCL10,DBLP:conf/ih/PevnyFB10} differ +how they select edge pixels, and +how they modify these ones. + +First of all, let us discuss about compexity of edge detetction methods. +Let then $M$ and $N$ be the dimension of the original image. +According to~\cite{Hu:2007:HPE:1282866.1282944}, +even if the fuzzy logic based edge detection methods~\cite{Tyan1993} +have promising results, its complexity is in $C_3 \times O(M \times N)$ +whereas the complexity on the Canny method~\cite{Canny:1986:CAE:11274.11275} +is in $C_1 \times O(M \times N)$ where $C_1 < C_3$. +\JFC{Verifier ceci...} +In experiments detailled in this article, the canny method has been retained +but the whole approach can be updated to consider +the fuzzy logic edge detector. + +Next, following~\cite{Luo:2010:EAI:1824719.1824720}, our scheme automatically +modifies canny parameters to get a sufficiently large set of edge bits: this +one is practically enlarged untill its size is at least twice as many larger +than the size of embedded message. \subsubsection{Security Considerations} @@ -104,6 +125,21 @@ it would thus be not possible to retrieve the original one in a polynomial time. +\subsubsection{Security Considerations} +Among methods of message encryption/decryption +(see~\cite{DBLP:journals/ejisec/FontaineG07} for a survey) +we implement the Blum-Goldwasser cryptosystem~\cite{Blum:1985:EPP:19478.19501} +which is based on the Blum Blum Shub~\cite{DBLP:conf/crypto/ShubBB82} Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) +for security reasons. +It has been indeed proven~\cite{DBLP:conf/crypto/ShubBB82} that this PRNG +has the cryptographically security property, \textit{i.e.}, +for any sequence $L$ of output bits $x_i$, $x_{i+1}$, \ldots, $x_{i+L-1}$, +there is no algorithm, whose time complexity is polynomial in $L$, and +which allows to find $x_{i-1}$ and $x_{i+L}$ with a probability greater +than $1/2$. +Thus, even if the encrypted message would be extracted, +it would thus be not possible to retrieve the original one in a +polynomial time.