modif

[prng_gpu.git] / reponse.tex

diff --git a/reponse.tex b/reponse.tex
index 5a762c2000ab3b9d77fee4ad51a92069f1d0551c..78354736bdfe8e75c551fa0d4e0512a223106483 100644 (file)
--- a/reponse.tex
+++ b/reponse.tex
@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@
 \bigskip
 \textit{The authors should include a summary of  test measurements showing their method passes the test sets mentioned (NIST, Diehard, TestU01) instead of the one sentence saying it passed that is in section 1.}
 
 \bigskip
 \textit{The authors should include a summary of  test measurements showing their method passes the test sets mentioned (NIST, Diehard, TestU01) instead of the one sentence saying it passed that is in section 1.}
 

-\begin{color}{red} In section 1, we have added a small summary of test measurements performed with BigCrush of TestU01.
-As other tests (NIST, Diehard, SmallCrush and Crush of TestU01 ) are deemed less selective, in this paper we did not use them.
-\end{color}
+In section 1, we have added a small summary of test measurements performed with BigCrush of TestU01.
+
+

 
 
 \bigskip
 
 
 \bigskip


@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ the time required to break it is astronomically large, making this attack comple
 impracticable: being cryptographically secure is not a
 question of key size.
 
 impracticable: being cryptographically secure is not a
 question of key size.
 

-\begin{color}{green}
+

 Most of theoretical cryptographic definitions are somehow an extension of the
 notion of one-way function. Intuitively a one way function is a function
  easy to compute but  which is practically impossible to
 Most of theoretical cryptographic definitions are somehow an extension of the
 notion of one-way function. Intuitively a one way function is a function
  easy to compute but  which is practically impossible to


@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ $f(y)\neq f(x)$. Informally, if a function is one-way, it means that every
 algorithm that can compute $x$ from $f(x)$ with a good probability requires
 a similar amount of time than the brute force attack. It is important to
 note that if the size of $x$ is small, then the brute force attack works in
 algorithm that can compute $x$ from $f(x)$ with a good probability requires
 a similar amount of time than the brute force attack. It is important to
 note that if the size of $x$ is small, then the brute force attack works in

-practice. The theoretical security properties don't guaranty that the system
+practice. The theoretical security properties do not guaranty that the system

 cannot be broken, it guaranty  that if the keys are large enough, then the
 system still works (computing $f(x)$ can be done, even if $x$ is large), and
 cannot be broken in a reasonable time. The theoretical definition of a
 cannot be broken, it guaranty  that if the keys are large enough, then the
 system still works (computing $f(x)$ can be done, even if $x$ is large), and
 cannot be broken in a reasonable time. The theoretical definition of a


@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ secure PRNG is more technical than the one on one-way function but the
 ideas are the same: a cryptographically secured PRNG can be broken 
  by a brute force prediction, but not in a reasonable time if the
  keys/seeds are large enough.
 ideas are the same: a cryptographically secured PRNG can be broken 
  by a brute force prediction, but not in a reasonable time if the
  keys/seeds are large enough.

-\end{color}
+

 
 Nevertheless, new arguments have been added in several places of the revision of our paper, 
 concerning more concrete and practical aspects of security, like the 
 
 Nevertheless, new arguments have been added in several places of the revision of our paper, 
 concerning more concrete and practical aspects of security, like the