Correction de coquilles dans le texte de pch

[prng_gpu.git] / prng_gpu.tex

diff --git a/prng_gpu.tex b/prng_gpu.tex
index 5ebe0efb295e6ae78a21bead73fd1cf8cef19b52..678217540467750ffd9322330118fe8e6593fa47 100644 (file)
--- a/prng_gpu.tex
+++ b/prng_gpu.tex
@@ -1118,15 +1118,15 @@ In this section the concatenation of two strings $u$ and $v$ is classically
 denoted by $uv$.
 In a cryptographic context, a pseudorandom generator is a deterministic
 algorithm $G$ transforming strings  into strings and such that, for any
 denoted by $uv$.
 In a cryptographic context, a pseudorandom generator is a deterministic
 algorithm $G$ transforming strings  into strings and such that, for any

-seed $w$ of length $N$, $G(w)$ (the output of $G$ on the input $w$) has size
-$\ell_G(N)$ with $\ell_G(N)>N$.
+seed $k$ of length $k$, $G(k)$ (the output of $G$ on the input $k$) has size
+$\ell_G(k)$ with $\ell_G(k)>k$.

 The notion of {\it secure} PRNGs can now be defined as follows. 
 
 \begin{definition}
 A cryptographic PRNG $G$ is secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time
 algorithm $D$, for any positive polynomial $p$, and for all sufficiently
 large $k$'s,
 The notion of {\it secure} PRNGs can now be defined as follows. 
 
 \begin{definition}
 A cryptographic PRNG $G$ is secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time
 algorithm $D$, for any positive polynomial $p$, and for all sufficiently
 large $k$'s,

-$$| \mathrm{Pr}[D(G(U_k))=1]-Pr[D(U_{\ell_G(k)})=1]|< \frac{1}{p(N)},$$
+$$| \mathrm{Pr}[D(G(U_k))=1]-Pr[D(U_{\ell_G(k)})=1]|< \frac{1}{p(k)},$$

 where $U_r$ is the uniform distribution over $\{0,1\}^r$ and the
 probabilities are taken over $U_N$, $U_{\ell_G(N)}$ as well as over the
 internal coin tosses of $D$. 
 where $U_r$ is the uniform distribution over $\{0,1\}^r$ and the
 probabilities are taken over $U_N$, $U_{\ell_G(N)}$ as well as over the
 internal coin tosses of $D$. 


@@ -1326,13 +1326,17 @@ been used.
 
 
 
 
 
 

-\subsection{A Cryptographically Secure and Chaotic Asymetric Cryptosystem}
+\subsection{Toward a Cryptographically Secure and Chaotic Asymmetric Cryptosystem}
+
+We finish this research work by giving some thoughts about the use of
+the proposed PRNG in an asymmetric cryptosystem.
+This first approach will be further investigated in a future work.

 
 \subsubsection{Recalls of the Blum-Goldwasser Probabilistic Cryptosystem}
 
 The Blum-Goldwasser cryptosystem is a cryptographically secure asymmetric key encryption algorithm 
 proposed in 1984~\cite{Blum:1985:EPP:19478.19501}.  The encryption algorithm 
 
 \subsubsection{Recalls of the Blum-Goldwasser Probabilistic Cryptosystem}
 
 The Blum-Goldwasser cryptosystem is a cryptographically secure asymmetric key encryption algorithm 
 proposed in 1984~\cite{Blum:1985:EPP:19478.19501}.  The encryption algorithm 

-implements an XOR-based stream cipher using the BBS PRNG, in order to generate 
+implements a XOR-based stream cipher using the BBS PRNG, in order to generate 

 the keystream. Decryption is done by obtaining the initial seed thanks to
 the final state of the BBS generator and the secret key, thus leading to the
  reconstruction of the keystream.
 the keystream. Decryption is done by obtaining the initial seed thanks to
 the final state of the BBS generator and the secret key, thus leading to the
  reconstruction of the keystream.


@@ -1345,34 +1349,49 @@ The public key is $N$, whereas the secret key is the factorization $(p,q)$.
 
 Suppose Bob wishes to send a string $m=(m_0, \dots, m_{L-1})$ of $L$ bits to Alice:
 \begin{enumerate}
 
 Suppose Bob wishes to send a string $m=(m_0, \dots, m_{L-1})$ of $L$ bits to Alice:
 \begin{enumerate}

-\item Bob picks an integer $r$ randomly in the interval $[1,N$ and computes $x_0 = r^2~mod~N$.
+\item Bob picks an integer $r$ randomly in the interval $\llbracket 1,N\rrbracket$ and computes $x_0 = r^2~mod~N$.

 \item He uses the BBS to generate the keystream of $L$ pseudorandom bits $(b_0, \dots, b_{L-1})$, as follows. For $i=0$ to $L-1$,
 \begin{itemize}
 \item $i=0$.
 \item While $i \leqslant L-1$:
 \begin{itemize}
 \item He uses the BBS to generate the keystream of $L$ pseudorandom bits $(b_0, \dots, b_{L-1})$, as follows. For $i=0$ to $L-1$,
 \begin{itemize}
 \item $i=0$.
 \item While $i \leqslant L-1$:
 \begin{itemize}

-\item Set $b_i$ equal to the least-significant\footnote{BBS can securely output up to O(loglogN) of the least-significant bits of xi during each round.} bit of $x_i$,
+\item Set $b_i$ equal to the least-significant\footnote{BBS can securely output up to $\mathsf{N} = \lfloor log(log(N)) \rfloor$ of the least-significant bits of $x_i$ during each round.} bit of $x_i$,

 \item $i=i+1$,
 \item $x_i = (x_{i-1})^2~mod~N.$
 \end{itemize}
 \end{itemize}
 \item $i=i+1$,
 \item $x_i = (x_{i-1})^2~mod~N.$
 \end{itemize}
 \end{itemize}

-\item The ciphertext is computed by XORing the plaintext bits $m$ with the keystream: $ c = (c_0, \dots, c_{L-1}) = m \oplus  b$.
+\item The ciphertext is computed by XORing the plaintext bits $m$ with the keystream: $ c = (c_0, \dots, c_{L-1}) = m \oplus  b$. This ciphertext is $[c, y]$, where $y=x_{0}^{2^{L}}~mod~N.$

 \end{enumerate}
 \end{enumerate}

-The ciphertext is $(c, y)$, where $y=x_{0}^{2^{L}}~mod~N.$.

 
 
 
 

-When Alice receives $(c_0, \dots, c_{L-1}), y$, she can recover $m$ as follows:
+When Alice receives $\left[(c_0, \dots, c_{L-1}), y\right]$, she can recover $m$ as follows:

 \begin{enumerate}
 \item Using the secret key $(p,q)$, she computes $r_p = y^{((p+1)/4)^{L}}~mod~p$ and $r_q = y^{((q+1)/4)^{L}}~mod~q$.
 \begin{enumerate}
 \item Using the secret key $(p,q)$, she computes $r_p = y^{((p+1)/4)^{L}}~mod~p$ and $r_q = y^{((q+1)/4)^{L}}~mod~q$.

-\item The initial seed can be obtained using the following procedure: $x_0=q(q^{-1}~{mod}~p)r_p + p(p^{-1}~{mod}~q)r_q~{mod}~N$
-\item Recompute the bit-vector $b$ by using BBS and $x_0$.
-\item Compute finally the plaintext by XORing the keystream with the ciphertext: $ m = c \oplus  b$.
+\item The initial seed can be obtained using the following procedure: $x_0=q(q^{-1}~{mod}~p)r_p + p(p^{-1}~{mod}~q)r_q~{mod}~N$.
+\item She recomputes the bit-vector $b$ by using BBS and $x_0$.
+\item Alice computes finally the plaintext by XORing the keystream with the ciphertext: $ m = c \oplus  b$.

 \end{enumerate}
 
 
 \subsubsection{Proposal of a new Asymmetric Cryptosystem Adapted from Blum-Goldwasser}
 
 \end{enumerate}
 
 
 \subsubsection{Proposal of a new Asymmetric Cryptosystem Adapted from Blum-Goldwasser}
 

+We propose to adapt the Blum-Goldwasser protocol as follows. 
+Let $\mathsf{N} = \lfloor log(log(N)) \rfloor$ be the number of bits that can
+be obtained securely with the BBS generator using the public key $N$ of Alice.
+Alice will pick randomly $S^0$ in $\llbracket 0, 2^{\mathsf{N}-1}\rrbracket$ too, and
+her new public key will be $(S^0, N)$.
+
+To encrypt his message, Bob will compute
+\begin{equation}
+c = \left(m_0 \oplus (b_0 \oplus S^0), m_1 \oplus (b_0 \oplus b_1 \oplus S^0), \hdots, m_{L-1} \oplus (b_0 \oplus b_1 \hdots \oplus b_{L-1} \oplus S^0) \right)
+\end{equation}
+instead of $\left(m_0 \oplus b_0, m_1 \oplus b_1, \hdots, m_{L-1} \oplus b_{L-1} \right)$. 

 
 

+The same decryption stage as in Blum-Goldwasser leads to the sequence 
+$\left(m_0 \oplus S^0, m_1 \oplus S^0, \hdots, m_{L-1} \oplus S^0 \right)$.
+Thus, with a simple use of $S^0$, Alice can obtained the plaintext.
+By doing so, the proposed generator is used in place of BBS, leading to
+the inheritance of all the properties presented in this paper.

 
 \section{Conclusion}
 
 
 \section{Conclusion}