X-Git-Url: https://bilbo.iut-bm.univ-fcomte.fr/and/gitweb/prng_gpu.git/blobdiff_plain/4ad2ccae91afa1f83fad9be3c87213a9b8d81734..c471dd052c6b541bcbc3712b5c3cad2e0f0df08b:/reponse.tex?ds=inline

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@@ -18,13 +18,17 @@
 \bigskip
 \textit{The authors should include a summary of  test measurements showing their method passes the test sets mentioned (NIST, Diehard, TestU01) instead of the one sentence saying it passed that is in section 1.}
 
-\begin{color}{red} Raph, c'est pour toi ça.\end{color}
+\begin{color}{red} In section 1, we have added a small summary of test measurements performed with BigCrush of TestU01.
+As other tests (NIST, Diehard, SmallCrush and Crush of TestU01 ) are deemed less selective, in this paper we did not use them.
+\end{color}
 
 
 \bigskip
 \textit{Section 9:
 The authors say they replace the xor-like PRNG with a cryptographically secure one, BBS, but then proceed to use extremely small values, as far as a cryptographer is concerned (modulus of $2^{16}$), in the computation  due  to the need to use 32 bit integers in the GPU and combine bits from multiple BBS generated values, but they never prove (or even discuss) how this  can be considered cryptographically secure due to the small  individual values. At the end of 9.1, the authors say $S^n$ is secure because it is formed from bits from the BBS generator, but do not consider if the use of such small values will lead to exhaust searches to determine individual bits. The authors either need to remove all of section 9 and or prove the resulting PRNG is cryptographically secure.}
 
+A new section has been added to measure practically the security of the generator.
+
 \bigskip
 \textit{In the conclusion:
 Reword last sentence of 1st paragraph