X-Git-Url: https://bilbo.iut-bm.univ-fcomte.fr/and/gitweb/prng_gpu.git/blobdiff_plain/893deb2477f17914ca2f0420009697c0925d5cbe..9fb4290afcf7de31edb7dda484ba7a2fedadaafb:/prng_gpu.tex?ds=inline

diff --git a/prng_gpu.tex b/prng_gpu.tex
index 32055e7..bc06797 100644
--- a/prng_gpu.tex
+++ b/prng_gpu.tex
@@ -180,8 +180,8 @@ Pseudorandom numbers are generated at a rate of 20GSamples/s, which is faster
 than in~\cite{conf/fpga/ThomasHL09,Marsaglia2003} (and with a better
 statistical behavior). Experiments are also provided using BBS as the initial
 random generator. The generation speed is significantly weaker.
-Note also that an original qualitative comparison between topological chaotic
-properties and statistical test is also proposed.
+%Note also that an original qualitative comparison between topological chaotic
+%properties and statistical test is also proposed.
 
 
 
@@ -204,8 +204,8 @@ Section~\ref{sec:experiments}.
 We show in Section~\ref{sec:security analysis} that, if the inputted
 generator is cryptographically secure, then it is the case too for the
 generator provided by the post-treatment.
-A practical
-security evaluation is also outlined in Section~\ref{sec:Practicak evaluation}.
+%A practical
+%security evaluation is also outlined in Section~\ref{sec:Practicak evaluation}.
 Such a proof leads to the proposition of a cryptographically secure and
 chaotic generator on GPU based on the famous Blum Blum Shub
 in Section~\ref{sec:CSGPU} and to an improvement of the
@@ -1638,13 +1638,13 @@ as it is shown in the next sections.
 
 
 This section is dedicated to the security analysis of the
-  proposed PRNGs, both from a theoretical and from a practical point of view.
+  proposed PRNGs.%, both from a theoretical and from a practical point of view.
 
-\subsection{Theoretical Proof of Security}
+%\subsection{Theoretical Proof of Security}
 \label{sec:security analysis}
 
 The standard definition
-  of {\it indistinguishability} used is the classical one as defined for
+  of {\it indistinguishability} used here is the classical one as defined for
   instance in~\cite[chapter~3]{Goldreich}. 
   This property shows that predicting the future results of the PRNG
   cannot be done in a reasonable time compared to the generation time. It is important to emphasize that this
@@ -1653,7 +1653,7 @@ The standard definition
   be broken in practice. But it also means that if the keys/seeds are large
   enough, the system is secured.
 As a complement, an example of a concrete practical evaluation of security
-is outlined in the next subsection.
+is outlined in Annex~\ref{A-sec:Practicak evaluation}.
 
 In this section the concatenation of two strings $u$ and $v$ is classically
 denoted by $uv$.
@@ -1766,9 +1766,11 @@ proving that $H$ is not secure, which is a contradiction.
 
 
 
-\subsection{Practical Security Evaluation}
-\label{sec:Practicak evaluation}
-This subsection is given in Section~\ref{A-sec:Practicak evaluation} of the annex document.
+%\subsection{Practical Security Evaluation}
+%\label{sec:Practicak evaluation}
+%This subsection is given in Section
+A example of a practical security evaluation is outlined in
+Annex~\ref{A-sec:Practicak evaluation}.
 %%RAF mis en annexe
 
 
@@ -2010,7 +2012,7 @@ on GPU can be useful in security context with the
 proposed parameters, or if it is only a very fast
 and statistically perfect generator on GPU, its
 $(T,\varepsilon)-$security must be determined, and
-a formulation similar to Eq.\eqref{mesureConcrete}
+a formulation similar to Annex~\ref{A-sec:Practicak evaluation} %.Eq.\eqref{mesureConcrete}
 must be established. Authors
 hope to achieve this difficult task in a future
 work.