X-Git-Url: https://bilbo.iut-bm.univ-fcomte.fr/and/gitweb/prng_gpu.git/blobdiff_plain/e413aa9f2f3893a394428e26368d44eaa851a986..a12a11a39f112c043de69e8694f29b32b8c7dbc5:/reponse.tex?ds=inline

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+++ b/reponse.tex
@@ -109,7 +109,24 @@ impracticable in practice. To sum up, being cryptographically secure is not a
 question of key size.
 
 \begin{color}{green}
-PCH, tu peux broder là-dessus?
+Most of theoretical cryptographic definitions are somehow an extension of the
+notion of one-way function. Intuitively a one way function is a function
+ easy to compute but  which is practically impossible to
+inverse (i.e. from $f(x)$ it is not possible to compute $x$). 
+Since the size of $x$ is known, it is always possible to use a brute force
+attack, that is computing $f(y)$ for all $y$'s of the good size until
+$f(y)\neq f(x)$. Informally, if a function is one-way, it means that every
+algorithm that can compute $x$ from $f(x)$ with a good probability requires
+a similar amount of time than the brute force attack. It is important to
+note that if the size of $x$ is small, then the brute force attack works in
+practice. The theoretical security properties don't guaranty that the system
+cannot be broken, it guaranty  that if the keys are large enough, then the
+system still works (computing $f(x)$ can be done, even if $x$ is large), and
+cannot be broken in a reasonable time. The theoretical definition of a
+secure PRNG is more technical than the one on one-way function but the
+ideas are the same: a cryptographically secured PRNG can be broken 
+ by a brute force prediction, but not in a reasonable time if the
+ keys/seeds are large enough.
 \end{color}
 
 \bigskip