From: guyeux <guyeux@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2011 20:20:32 +0000 (+0100)
Subject: Ajout e la preuve de pch
X-Git-Url: https://bilbo.iut-bm.univ-fcomte.fr/and/gitweb/prng_gpu.git/commitdiff_plain/47000eb06d8648eaafeadfdda00e1e4ce76e9ee6?ds=inline

Ajout e la preuve de pch
---

diff --git a/prng_gpu.tex b/prng_gpu.tex
index 2dfa78e..d2e5e05 100644
--- a/prng_gpu.tex
+++ b/prng_gpu.tex
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ on GPU}
 \begin{document}
 
 \author{Jacques M. Bahi, Rapha\"{e}l Couturier, and Christophe
-Guyeux\thanks{Authors in alphabetic order}}
+Guyeux, Pierre-Cyrille Heam\thanks{Authors in alphabetic order}}
 
 \maketitle
 
@@ -1517,6 +1517,118 @@ In  comparison,   Listing~\ref{algo:seqCIprng}  allows  us   to  generate  about
 
 
 
+\section{Security Analysis}
+
+
+
+
+In this section the concatenation of two strings $u$ and $v$ is classically
+denoted by $uv$.
+In a cryptographic context, a pseudo-random generator is a deterministic
+algorithm $G$ transforming strings  into strings and such that, for any
+seed $w$ of length $N$, $G(w)$ (the output of $G$ on the input $w$) has size
+$\ell_G(N)$ with $\ell_G(N)>N$.
+The notion of {\it secure} PRNGs can now be defined as follows. 
+
+\begin{definition}
+A cryptographic PRNG $G$ is secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time
+algorithm $D$, for any positive polynomial $p$, and for all sufficiently
+large $k$'s,
+$$| \mathrm{Pr}[D(G(U_k))=1]-Pr[D(U_{\ell_G(k)}=1]|< \frac{1}{p(N)},$$
+where $U_r$ is the uniform distribution over $\{0,1\}^r$ and the
+probabilities are taken over $U_N$, $U_{\ell_G(N)}$ as well as over the
+internal coin tosses of $D$. 
+\end{definition}
+
+Intuitively, it means that there is no polynomial time algorithm that can
+distinguish a perfect uniform random generator from $G$ with a non
+negligible probability. The interested reader is referred
+to~\cite[chapter~3]{Goldreich} for more information. Note that it is
+quite easily possible to change the function $\ell$ into any polynomial
+function $\ell^\prime$ satisfying $\ell^\prime(N)>N)$~\cite[Chapter 3.3]{Goldreich}.
+
+The generation schema developed in (\ref{equation Oplus}) is based on a
+pseudo-random generator. Let $H$ be a cryptographic PRNG. We may assume,
+without loss of generality, that for any string $S_0$ of size $N$, the size
+of $H(S_0)$ is $kN$, with $k>2$. It means that $\ell_H(N)=kN$. 
+Let $S_1,\ldots,S_k$ be the 
+strings of length $N$ such that $H(S_0)=S_1 \ldots S_k$ ($H(S_0)$ is the concatenation of
+the $S_i$'s). The cryptographic PRNG $X$ defined in (\ref{equation Oplus})
+is the algorithm mapping any string of length $2N$ $x_0S_0$ into the string
+$(x_0\oplus S_0 \oplus S_1)(x_0\oplus S_0 \oplus S_1\oplus S_2)\ldots
+(x_o\bigoplus_{i=0}^{i=k}S_i)$. Particularly one has $\ell_{X}(2N)=kN=\ell_H(N)$. 
+We claim now that if this PRNG is secure,
+then the new one is secure too.
+
+\begin{proposition}
+If $H$ is a secure cryptographic PRNG, then $X$ is a secure cryptographic
+PRNG too.
+\end{proposition}
+
+\begin{proof}
+The proposition is proved by contraposition. Assume that $X$ is not
+secure. By Definition, there exists a polynomial time probabilistic
+algorithm $D$, a positive polynomial $p$, such that for all $k_0$ there exists
+$N\geq \frac{k_0}{2}$ satisfying 
+$$| \mathrm{Pr}[D(X(U_{2N}))=1]-\mathrm{Pr}[D(U_{kN}=1]|\geq \frac{1}{p(2N)}.$$
+We describe a new probabilistic algorithm $D^\prime$ on an input $w$ of size
+$kN$:
+\begin{enumerate}
+\item Decompose $w$ into $w=w_1\ldots w_{k}$, where each $w_i$ has size $N$.
+\item Pick a string $y$ of size $N$ uniformly at random.
+\item Compute $z=(y\oplus w_1)(y\oplus w_1\oplus w_2)\ldots (y
+  \bigoplus_{i=1}^{i=k} w_i).$
+\item Return $D(z)$.
+\end{enumerate}
+
+
+Consider  for each $y\in \mathbb{B}^{kN}$ the function $\varphi_{y}$
+from $\mathbb{B}^{kN}$ into $\mathbb{B}^{kN}$ mapping $w=w_1\ldots w_k$
+(each $w_i$ has length $N$) to 
+$(y\oplus w_1)(y\oplus w_1\oplus w_2)\ldots (y
+  \bigoplus_{i=1}^{i=k_1} w_i).$ By construction, one has for every $w$,
+\begin{equation}\label{PCH-1}
+D^\prime(w)=D(\varphi_y(w)),
+\end{equation}
+where $y$ is randomly generated. 
+Moreover, for each $y$, $\varphi_{y}$ is injective: if 
+$(y\oplus w_1)(y\oplus w_1\oplus w_2)\ldots (y\bigoplus_{i=1}^{i=k_1}
+w_i)=(y\oplus w_1^\prime)(y\oplus w_1^\prime\oplus w_2^\prime)\ldots
+(y\bigoplus_{i=1}^{i=k} w_i^\prime)$, then for every $1\leq j\leq k$,
+$y\bigoplus_{i=1}^{i=j} w_i^\prime=y\bigoplus_{i=1}^{i=j} w_i$. It follows,
+by a direct induction, that $w_i=w_i^\prime$. Furthermore, since $\mathbb{B}^{kN}$
+is finite, each $\varphi_y$ is bijective. Therefore, and using (\ref{PCH-1}),
+one has
+\begin{equation}\label{PCH-2}
+\mathrm{Pr}[D^\prime(U_{kN})=1]=\mathrm{Pr}[D(\varphi_y(U_{kN}))=1]=\mathrm{Pr}[D(U_{kN})=1].
+\end{equation}
+
+Now, using (\ref{PCH-1}) again, one has  for every $x$,
+\begin{equation}\label{PCH-3}
+D^\prime(H(x))=D(\varphi_y(H(x))),
+\end{equation}
+where $y$ is randomly generated. By construction, $\varphi_y(H(x))=X(yx)$,
+thus
+\begin{equation}\label{PCH-3}
+D^\prime(H(x))=D(yx),
+\end{equation}
+where $y$ is randomly generated. 
+It follows that 
+
+\begin{equation}\label{PCH-4}
+\mathrm{Pr}[D^\prime(H(U_{N}))=1]=\mathrm{Pr}[D(U_{2N})=1].
+\end{equation}
+ From (\ref{PCH-2}) and (\ref{PCH-4}), one can deduce that
+there exist a polynomial time probabilistic
+algorithm $D^\prime$, a positive polynomial $p$, such that for all $k_0$ there exists
+$N\geq \frac{k_0}{2}$ satisfying 
+$$| \mathrm{Pr}[D(H(U_{N}))=1]-\mathrm{Pr}[D(U_{kN}=1]|\geq \frac{1}{p(2N)},$$
+proving that $H$ is not secure, a contradiction. 
+\end{proof}
+
+
+
+
 
 \section{Conclusion}