From 9fb4290afcf7de31edb7dda484ba7a2fedadaafb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pierre-Cyrille Heam Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2012 09:59:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] =?utf8?q?pch=20:=20mise=20a=20jour=20de=20reponse=20pour?= =?utf8?q?=20les=20refs=20sur=20le=20nouveau=20document=20+=20mise=20?= =?utf8?q?=C3=A0=20jour=20de=20la=20ref?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- mabase.bib | 5 ++--- reponse.tex | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/mabase.bib b/mabase.bib index 658392c..12ada72 100644 --- a/mabase.bib +++ b/mabase.bib @@ -859,12 +859,11 @@ note = {To appear}, Boolean Discrete-Time Dynamical Systems}, booktitle = {FCT'11, 18th Int. Symp. on Fundamentals of Computation Theory}, year = {2011}, - volume = {*}, + volume = {6914}, series = {LNCS}, - pages = {***--***}, + pages = {126-137}, address = {Oslo, Norway}, month = aug, - note = {To appear}, classement = {ACTI}, domainehal = {INFO:INFO_DC, INFO:INFO_CR, INFO:INFO_MO}, equipe = {and}, diff --git a/reponse.tex b/reponse.tex index a0d3da6..632c9ec 100644 --- a/reponse.tex +++ b/reponse.tex @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ In section 1, we have added a small summary of test measurements performed with \textit{Section 9: The authors say they replace the xor-like PRNG with a cryptographically secure one, BBS, but then proceed to use extremely small values, as far as a cryptographer is concerned (modulus of $2^{16}$), in the computation due to the need to use 32 bit integers in the GPU and combine bits from multiple BBS generated values, but they never prove (or even discuss) how this can be considered cryptographically secure due to the small individual values. At the end of 9.1, the authors say $S^n$ is secure because it is formed from bits from the BBS generator, but do not consider if the use of such small values will lead to exhaust searches to determine individual bits. The authors either need to remove all of section 9 and or prove the resulting PRNG is cryptographically secure.} -A new section (namely, Section 8.2) and a discussion at the end of Section 9.1 have been added to measure practically the security of the generator. +A section in the Annex document (namely, Section~3) and a discussion at the end of Section 9.1 have been added to measure practically the security of the generator. \bigskip \textit{In the conclusion: @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ generator is not cryptographically secure in the example disputed by the reviewer, we cannot apply this result. Indeed the first part of the document does not deal with security, but it investigates the speed, chaos, and statistical quality of PRNGs. A sentence has been added to clarify this point -at the end of Section 5.4. +at the end of Section 5. \bigskip @@ -142,11 +142,11 @@ ideas are the same: a cryptographically secured PRNG can be broken Nevertheless, new arguments have been added in several places of the revision of our paper, concerning more concrete and practical aspects of security, like the -$(T,\varepsilon)-$security notion of Section 8.2. Such a practical evaluation +$(T,\varepsilon)-$security notion of Section 3 of the Annex document. Such a practical evaluation has not yet been performed for the GPU version of our PRNG, and the reviewer is right to think that these aspects are fundamental to determine whether the proposed PRNG can or cannot face the attacks. A similar formula to what has been -computed for the BBS (as in Section 8.2) must be found in future work, to +computed for the BBS (as in Section 3 of the Annexe document) must be found in future work, to measure the amount of time need by an attacker to break the proposed generator when considering the parameters we have chosen (this computation is a difficult task). Sentences have been added in several places (like at the end of Section -- 2.39.5