1 The flowcharts given in Fig.~\ref{fig:sch} summarize our steganography scheme denoted by
2 STABYLO, which stands for STeganography with Canny, Bbs, binarY embedding at LOw cost.
3 What follows successively details all the inner steps and flows inside
4 both the embedding stage (Fig.~\ref{fig:sch:emb})
5 and the extraction one (Fig.~\ref{fig:sch:ext}).
10 \subfloat[Data Embedding.]{
11 \begin{minipage}{0.49\textwidth}
13 \includegraphics[width=5cm]{emb.pdf}
14 %\includegraphics[width=5cm]{emb.ps}
19 \subfloat[Data Extraction.]{
20 \begin{minipage}{0.49\textwidth}
22 \includegraphics[width=5cm]{rec.pdf}
23 %\includegraphics[width=5cm]{rec.ps}
29 \caption{The STABYLO Scheme.}
36 \subsection{Data Embedding}
37 This section describes the main three steps of the STABYLO data embedding
42 \subsubsection{Edge Based Image Steganography}
45 The edge based image steganography schemes
46 already presented (\cite{Luo:2010:EAI:1824719.1824720,DBLP:journals/eswa/ChenCL10}) differ
47 in how carefully they select edge pixels, and
50 Image Quality: Edge Image Steganography
51 \JFC{Raphael, les fuzzy edge detection sont souvent utilisés.
52 il faudrait comparer les approches en terme de nombre de bits retournés,
53 en terme de complexité. } \cite{KF11}
54 \RC{Ben, à voir car on peut choisir le nombre de pixel avec Canny. Supposons que les fuzzy edge soient retourne un peu plus de points, on sera probablement plus détectable... Finalement on devrait surement vendre notre truc en : on a choisi cet algo car il est performant en vitesse/qualité. Mais on peut aussi en utilisé d'autres :-)}
56 Many techniques have been proposed in the literature to detect
58 The most common ones are filter
59 edge detection methods such as Sobel or Canny filters, low order methods such as
60 first order and second order ones. These methods are based on gradient or
61 Laplace operators and fuzzy edge methods, which are based on fuzzy logic to
64 Of course, all the algorithms have advantages and drawbacks that depend on the
65 motivations behind that edges detection. Unfortunately unless testing most of the
66 algorithms, which would require many times, it is quite difficult to have an
67 accurate idea on what would produce such algorithm compared to another. That is
68 why we have chosen Canny algorithm, which is well known, fast, and implementable
69 on many kinds of architectures like FPGAs, smartphones, desktop machines, and
70 GPUs. And of course, we do not pretend that this is the best solution.
72 In order to be able to compute the same set of edge pixels, we suggest to consider all the bits of the image (cover or stego) without the LSB. With an 8 bits image, only the 7 first bits are considered. In our flowcharts, this is represented by ``LSB(7 bits Edge Detection)''.
73 % First of all, let us discuss about compexity of edge detetction methods.
74 % Let then $M$ and $N$ be the dimension of the original image.
75 % According to~\cite{Hu:2007:HPE:1282866.1282944},
76 % even if the fuzzy logic based edge detection methods~\cite{Tyan1993}
77 % have promising results, its complexity is in $C_3 \times O(M \times N)$
78 % whereas the complexity on the Canny method~\cite{Canny:1986:CAE:11274.11275}
79 % is in $C_1 \times O(M \times N)$ where $C_1 < C_3$.
80 % \JFC{Verifier ceci...}
81 % In experiments detailled in this article, the Canny method has been retained
82 % but the whole approach can be updated to consider
83 % the fuzzy logic edge detector.
84 Next, following~\cite{Luo:2010:EAI:1824719.1824720}, our scheme automatically
85 modifies the Canny algorithm
86 parameters to get a sufficiently large set of edge bits: this
87 one is practically enlarged until its size is at least twice as large
88 as the size of the embedded message.
90 % Edge Based Image Steganography schemes
91 % already studied~\cite{Luo:2010:EAI:1824719.1824720,DBLP:journals/eswa/ChenCL10,DBLP:conf/ih/PevnyFB10} differ
92 % how they select edge pixels, and
93 % how they modify these ones.
95 % First of all, let us discuss about compexity of edge detetction methods.
96 % Let then $M$ and $N$ be the dimension of the original image.
97 % According to~\cite{Hu:2007:HPE:1282866.1282944},
98 % even if the fuzzy logic based edge detection methods~\cite{Tyan1993}
99 % have promising results, its complexity is in $C_3 \times O(M \times N)$
100 % whereas the complexity on the Canny method~\cite{Canny:1986:CAE:11274.11275}
101 % is in $C_1 \times O(M \times N)$ where $C_1 < C_3$.
102 % \JFC{Verifier ceci...}
103 % In experiments detailled in this article, the Canny method has been retained
104 % but the whole approach can be updated to consider
105 % the fuzzy logic edge detector.
107 % Next, following~\cite{Luo:2010:EAI:1824719.1824720}, our scheme automatically
108 % modifies Canny parameters to get a sufficiently large set of edge bits: this
109 % one is practically enlarged untill its size is at least twice as many larger
110 % than the size of embedded message.
113 \subsubsection{Security Considerations}
114 Among methods of message encryption/decryption
115 (see~\cite{DBLP:journals/ejisec/FontaineG07} for a survey)
116 we implement the Blum-Goldwasser cryptosystem~\cite{Blum:1985:EPP:19478.19501}
117 that is based on the Blum Blum Shub~\cite{DBLP:conf/crypto/ShubBB82} pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)
118 for security reasons.
119 It has been indeed proven~\cite{DBLP:conf/crypto/ShubBB82} that this PRNG
120 has the cryptographically security property, \textit{i.e.},
121 for any sequence of $L$ output bits $x_i$, $x_{i+1}$, \ldots, $x_{i+L-1}$,
122 there is no algorithm, whose time complexity is polynomial in $L$, and
123 which allows to find $x_{i-1}$ and $x_{i+L}$ with a probability greater
125 Equivalent formulations of such a property can
126 be found. They all lead to the fact that,
127 even if the encrypted message is extracted,
128 it is impossible to retrieve the original one in
132 %%RAPH: paragraphe en double :-)
134 %% \subsubsection{Security Considerations}
135 %% Among methods of message encryption/decryption
136 %% (see~\cite{DBLP:journals/ejisec/FontaineG07} for a survey)
137 %% we implement the Blum-Goldwasser cryptosystem~\cite{Blum:1985:EPP:19478.19501}
138 %% which is based on the Blum Blum Shub~\cite{DBLP:conf/crypto/ShubBB82} Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
139 %% for security reasons.
140 %% It has been indeed proven~\cite{DBLP:conf/crypto/ShubBB82} that this PRNG
141 %% has the cryptographically security property, \textit{i.e.},
142 %% for any sequence $L$ of output bits $x_i$, $x_{i+1}$, \ldots, $x_{i+L-1}$,
143 %% there is no algorithm, whose time complexity is polynomial in $L$, and
144 %% which allows to find $x_{i-1}$ and $x_{i+L}$ with a probability greater
146 %% Thus, even if the encrypted message would be extracted,
147 %% it would thus be not possible to retrieve the original one in a
154 \subsubsection{Minimizing Distortion with Syndrome-Treillis Codes}
158 \subsection{Data Extraction}
159 Message extraction summarized in Fig.~\ref{fig:sch:ext} follows data embedding
160 since there exists a reverse function for all its steps.
161 First of all, the same edge detection is applied (on the 7 first bits) to get set,
162 which is sufficiently large with respect to the message size given as a key.
163 Then the STC reverse algorithm is applied to retrieve the encrypted message.
164 Finally, the Blum-Goldwasser decryption function is executed and the original
165 message is extracted.