\bigskip
\textit{The authors should include a summary of test measurements showing their method passes the test sets mentioned (NIST, Diehard, TestU01) instead of the one sentence saying it passed that is in section 1.}
-\begin{color}{red} In section 1, we have added a small summary of test measurements performed with BigCrush of TestU01.
-As other tests (NIST, Diehard, SmallCrush and Crush of TestU01 ) are deemed less selective, in this paper we did not use them.
-\end{color}
+In section 1, we have added a small summary of test measurements performed with BigCrush of TestU01.
+
+
\bigskip
impracticable: being cryptographically secure is not a
question of key size.
-\begin{color}{green}
+
Most of theoretical cryptographic definitions are somehow an extension of the
notion of one-way function. Intuitively a one way function is a function
easy to compute but which is practically impossible to
algorithm that can compute $x$ from $f(x)$ with a good probability requires
a similar amount of time than the brute force attack. It is important to
note that if the size of $x$ is small, then the brute force attack works in
-practice. The theoretical security properties don't guaranty that the system
+practice. The theoretical security properties do not guaranty that the system
cannot be broken, it guaranty that if the keys are large enough, then the
system still works (computing $f(x)$ can be done, even if $x$ is large), and
cannot be broken in a reasonable time. The theoretical definition of a
ideas are the same: a cryptographically secured PRNG can be broken
by a brute force prediction, but not in a reasonable time if the
keys/seeds are large enough.
-\end{color}
+
Nevertheless, new arguments have been added in several places of the revision of our paper,
concerning more concrete and practical aspects of security, like the
